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11.1  Introduction 
This paper presents a set of generational accounts to contribute to the assess- 
ment of France’s long-term fiscal position. Understanding the sustainability of 
fiscal policy in France from a generational perspective is important in many 
respects. France has one of the most extensive social security and welfare sys- 
tems among the large industrialized countries; public expenditure on health as 
a share of GDP is the highest in Europe; and compared to other Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, its pension 
system is generous (table 11.1). Not only are benefits high, but so is the level 
of taxation; taxes needed to finance social security funds have risen from less 
than 15 percent of wage income in 1950 to almost 50 percent in 1996. In recent 
years, there have been mounting concerns regarding the continuing viability of 
such an extensive social security system in general, and its unfunded pay-as- 
you-go pension schemes and its universal health care in particular. Slower rates 
of  economic growth and the prospective aging of  the population have led to 
further concerns that the implied taxation burden on younger (working) gener- 
ations in the future will be too high, assuming the continuation of the general 
thrust of current policy settings. Projected trends of changes in the age struc- 
ture reveal that an increasing number of retirees must be supported by a declin- 
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Table 11.1  Comparative  Fiscal Indicators, 1994 (percent of GDP) 
France  United States  Japan  Germany  Italy 
General government 
Tax revenue  43.0  30.1 
Spending  53.9  33.4 
Deficit  5.0  1.8 
Gross public debt  59.5  63.0 
Public pensions  13.5  7.1 
Public health  7.2  6.5 








38.1  37.8 
49.1  52.7 
2.3  7.8 
62.5  122.1 
12.3  14.2 
6.1  6.3 
3.1  4.3 
Source: OECD (1995). 
Table 11.2  Comparative  Demographic Factors, 1990-95 
France  United States  Japan  Germany  Italy 
Population (1994)  57,960  260.65 1  124,960  81,407  57,190 
Fertility ratea  1.8  2.1  1.5  I .3  1.3 
Life expectancy at birth  77.2  76.6  79.1  75.8  77.4 
Net migration rateb  1.2  2.5  0.0  5.6  1 .o 
Participation rate  66.7  76.0  76.1  69.7  58.2 
Source: Bos et al. (1994). 
aNumber of children per woman of childbearing age. 
bNumber of net immigrants per 1,OOO  people. 
ing number of workers, with the old-age dependency ratio (for a constant par- 
ticipation rate) likely to rise from 0.35 to 0.60 by 2030 (tables 11.2 and 11.3). 
Recent reform efforts have contributed to reducing social security spending 
below trend, but the long-run sustainability of the system remains in question. 
A reform of the basic pension system effected in 1993, while formalizing the 
indexation of pensions to the CPI instead of wages (pensions had been loosely 
indexed to the CPI since 1987), failed to attack longer term problems, in partic- 
ular the relatively low minimum retirement age enshrined in legislation passed 
in 1982. Health expenditure growth has been curbed in recent years, but mainly 
through the imposition of expenditure ceilings that have created strong pres- 
sures for an eventual catch-up process. A far-reaching reform of the health 
system was announced in late 1995 but has yet to be fully implemented. More 
generally, a substantial fiscal consolidation has taken place since 1995, reduc- 
ing the fiscal deficit from around 6 percent of  GDP to close to 3 percent of 
GDP, but it has been achieved largely through the compression of expenditure 
and an increase in taxes, rather than structural, forward-looking changes in ex- 
penditure  patterns. Therefore,  while  current government accounts have im- 
proved, and further consolidation is envisaged by the “Stability and Growth 
Pact” signed by candidates to the European Economic and Monetary Union Table 113  Demographic 'hamition 
1995  2000  2010  2020  2030  2050 
Population (thousands)  58,048  59,425  60,993  62,121  62,661  62,120 
Very elderly dependency ratiob  39.2  43.4  49.6  41.9  48.8  56.6 
Total dependency ratioc  52.2  52.8  51.2  59.6  67.9  73.6 
Elderly dependency ratio"  22.1  23.6  24.6  32.3  39.1  43.5 
Source: Bos et al. (1994). 
'Population aged 65 or  older as a percentage of the population aged 15 to 64. 
bPopulation  aged 75 or older as a percentage of the population aged 65 or older. 
'Population aged 0 to 14 and 65 or older as a percentage of the population aged 15 to 64 242  Joaquim Levy and Ousmane Do& 
(EMU),  sole  consideration  of  the  conventional  fiscal  deficit  in  assessing 
France’s fiscal policy  stance-and  particularly  its  sustainability-would  be 
misleading. 
Behind concerns about the sustainability of the welfare system and the cur- 
rent  real  level  of  public  consumption  expenditures  looms the  fundamental 
question of how fiscal policy affects the distribution of income between gen- 
erations. In general, fiscal settings that imply markedly increased burdens on 
some generations, relative to other generations, constitute a cause for concern. 
The standard measure of the budget deficit cannot appropriately address this 
question (Kotlikoff  1992). In contrast, generational accounting provides a tool 
for the investigation of the intergenerational distributional effects of fiscal pol- 
icy. The purpose of this paper is thus to use this technique to determine whether 
current fiscal policies in France can be sustained without requiring future gener- 
ations to pay higher net taxes over their lifetimes than current generations pay. 
Our calculations indicate that France’s generational policy  is imbalanced 
against future generations. Despite the ongoing fiscal contraction, the pattern 
of social benefits  (in particular pensions) implies a projected net tax burden 
adjusted for income growth on future French  citizens that is about twice as 
large as that facing current young generations. While the precise size of this 
generational imbalance depends on a number of assumptions, including the 
rates of discount and productivity growth, the direction of the imbalance is 
unmistakable, as it holds under alternative  assumptions about these parame- 
ters. It is also noteworthy that these projections do not build in feedback effects 
from policies that may be necessary to ensure the “balancing” in the future of 
the government’s intertemporal budget constraint, such as increases in taxation, 
which could significantly  weaken the underlying growth of income, thereby 
amplifying the  imbalance. The size of  generational  imbalance  existing  be- 
tween selected currently living generations is also computed, taking into ac- 
count the net tax paid by current adults in the past. On this basis, the calcula- 
tions show that protecting the “baby boom” generations from any change in 
fiscal policy (thus leaving to young and future generations the full responsibil- 
ity to redress any fiscal imbalance) would imply a projected net tax burden on 
those now under age 25 that is more than twice as large as that facing those 
born around 1950. 
Section  11.2 provides  an overview of developments in France’s public fi- 
nances. Following a brief presentation of the generational accounting frame- 
work,  section  11.3 presents  estimates  of  generational  accounts  for  France 
based on policies  in place in  1995. In section  11.4, the lifetime net tax pay- 
ments of current adults are calculated and compared with those of younger 
living generations. Sensitivity analysis with respect to key parameters is con- 
ducted in section 11  .5, and alternative scenarios on policies aimed at redressing 
the generational imbalance are discussed in sections  11.6 and  11.7. Finally, 
section  11.8 summarizes these findings and concludes. An appendix provides 
details on the calculation of the accounts, including the data sources. 243  Generational Accounting for France 
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Fig. 11.1 
Source: INSEE, quarterly national accounts. 
General government financial balance (percent of GDP) 
11.2  Public Finances in France 
France’s  overall public  finances deteriorated from  a surplus in  the early 
1980s to persistent deficits in the 1990s (fig. ll.l), which have accumulated 
over the years, leading to a rise in the ratio of public debt to GDP from 20 per- 
cent to close to 60 percent. The deterioration of the general government balance 
that began in the late 1980s reflected in large part a marked increase in overall 
spending, mainly social expenditures. In the 1990s, it has been aggravated by 
relatively weak economic growth, which has reduced tax buoyance and has in- 
creased outlays associated with entitlements (e.g., minimum income payments 
and a number of tax allowances). Public spending as a share of GDP rose from 
46.5 percent of GDP in 1980 to about 53.8 percent in 1995, one of the highest 
levels among large industrial countries. 
Meanwhile, a series of tax increases have contributed to a ratio of  govern- 
ment revenue to GDP that is both the highest among the seven major industrial 
economies and heavily dependent on  wage-based social security contribu- 
ti0ns.I French public accounts reached a low point in 1993, when, in part due 
1. The general government revenue ratio reached 48.9 percent in  1995 after slightly declining 
in the second half of the 1980s. Contrary to what happened in many other developed countries, 
France had no major tax reform in the 1980s, but specific changes undertaken almost every year 
in the tax  rules (and in particular a reduction in income tax rates in  the late  1980s when the 
economy was booming) have changed considerably the structure of  the tax system: a relatively 
low share of personal income tax in government, and yet a high burden of taxation. Revenues from 
income taxes were 7.2 percent of  GDP in 1994, compared to an average of 10 percent of GDP for 
the seven large industrial countries. Social security contributions, on the other hand, are very high, 244  Joaquir  1 Levy and Ousmane Dor6 
to the recession that began in 1992, the deficit widened to 6.1 percent of GDP. 
Thereafter, and under the aegis of  the Maastricht Treaty on Economic and 
Monetary Union, fiscal policy has been oriented toward consolidation in order 
to meet public deficit and debt criteria established by  this treaty.’  Efforts to 
strengthen the public finances undertaken since mid- 1995 appear on balance 
to have yielded some results, with the general government deficit declining to 
close to 3 percent in  1997. This improvement, however, has resulted chiefly 
from increases in taxes, and to a lesser extent from belt-tightening  measure^.^ 
Even a cursory analysis of the expenditure dynamics witnessed in the past 
three decades makes clear that the public sector, which has traditionally played 
a considerable role in France, has continued to expand, while experiencing 
some changes in its scope since the early 1970s. As shown in figure 11.2, total 
outlays of the general government as a share of GDP rose very rapidly between 
the early 1970s and early 1980s, falling thereafter until the late 1980s as a re- 
sult of  stronger economic growth over this period  and some reform efforts 
aimed at containing spending (e.g., global budgets for hospitals) and shifting 
the focus of industrial policy (e.g., by cutting subsidies to enterprises). Slower 
growth since 1991 has in part been responsible for a sharply rising expenditure 
share in recent years. Current transfers-mainly  to households-have  been the 
most rapidly rising item, representing 45 percent of total spending in 1980 and 
more than half in 1995, whereas the share of public consumption in total gen- 
at 21 percent of GDP compared to an average of  11 percent for the seven large industrial countries. 
Some broadening of the income tax base has taken place in recent years, through the introduction 
of a number of broad-based flat income taxes, notably the Contribution Sociale GLnCralise (CSG; 
introduced in 1991 and used to finance social security) and the Remboursement de la Dette Sociale 
(RDS; introduced in February  1996 and earmarked to finance a sinking fund set up to repay the 
deficit accumulated by the social security administration in recent years). Reductions in the burden 
of wage-based social security taxation were initially pursued through the introduction of a system 
of partial exemptions from payment of employer social security contributions. More recently,  a 
gradual raise of the rate of the CSG was decided upon, to permit the financing of public health 
care to be shifted away from social security contributions (from 1998, the CSG rate will be raised 
by 4.1 percentage points to 7.5 percent of capital and wage incomes). 
2. These criteria consist of capping the general government deficit at 3 percent of GDP, and the 
stock of public debt at 60 percent of GDP. While the deficit criterion has been strengthened in 
1995 in accordance with the “Stability and Growth Pact,” there has been some flexibility in the 
interpretation of the debt criterion. The latter criterion, while somewhat forward looking, does not 
take into account the implicit debt of the social security system, which in the case of France was 
estimated to be at about 100 percent of GDP in 1993 (Kunt, Petit, and Pinxt  1993). Maastricht 
deficit criteria were set on a national accounts basis, with a view to homogenizing cross-country 
comparisons and bringing a degree of transparency to fiscal accounts that is absent in most public 
budgeting accounting.  Nevertheless, as  1998 approached,  Eurostat endorsed  the recording  as 
deficit-reducing current revenues receipts from some operations that could be plausibly classified 
as exchange of assets (and as such usually classified as financial operations). 
3. The contribution of public enterprises to the consolidation effort was mixed, as several of 
them needed to be recapitalized, in addition to the cases of some public banks that produced large 
contingent shortfalls. On the other hand, the transfer of France Telecom’s future pension liabilities 
to the state budget, against a lump-sum payment (recorded as a deficit-reducing current revenue), 
while generating a negative cash flow in coming years (ceteris paribus burdening future genera- 
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Fig. 11.2  General government revenue and expenditure (percent of GDP) 
Source: INSEE, quarterly national accounts 
era1 government expenditure has declined, largely as a result of  strict public 
sector wage p01icy.~ 
A widely observed source of spending growth has been the expansion of the 
social security system. Previously close to balance, the social security accounts 
have run deficits of about 1 percent of GDP from 1992 ~nward.~  Between 1980 
and  1995, social security spending as a share of GDP rose by  5 percentage 
points. Expenditure on pensions, which represented only about 5 percent of 
GDP in 1960, rose to 10 percent in 1980 and more than 12 percent in 1995. 
Health expenditure has increased at an annual rate of  0.7 percentage points 
greater than that of  nominal GDP since 1980; its share in GDP rose from 4 
percent in 1960 to over 9 percent in 1995.  Demographic factors have accounted 
for a good share of  the rise in social expenditure (according to the OECD, 
about 50 percent of the increase in health care costs can be attributed to popula- 
tion aging). However, policies and economic conditions have  also played a 
role. For instance, the coming to maturity of the pension system instituted in 
1945 lies behind the increase in contribution rates required to balance the pay- 
4. The share of  compensation of  public sector employees in GDP has remained flat despite a 
continuous increase in total public sector employment, which currently represents 25 percent of 
total domestic employment as opposed to 20 percent in 1980. 
5. By law the social security system has to close the year in balance; in recent years this has 
required complex financial operations, promptly reversed at the beginning of  the new year. This 
window dressing has not, however, been hidden from the public, as biannual reports of the finances 
of social security pointing to the sources of  imbalances in the accounts of the system have received 
wide publicity. 246  Joaquim Levy and Ousmane Dor6 
as-you-go scheme, and increases in health care expenditure have often been 
associated with higher income levels. In the case of pensions, while life expec- 
tancy had risen substantially, the minimum retirement age was reduced in 1982 
from 65 years to 60, and as in other European countries, a number of  early 
retirement schemes were introduced after 1980. 
Other social outlays also increased due to changing economic conditions. 
Most notably, unemployment benefits rose extremely fast in real terms during 
the 1970s, when the rate of unemployment increased from 2 percent to 8-9 
percent. The average annual real growth rate of benefits per capita was, how- 
ever, curtailed in the 1980s when policy reforms made the system progressively 
less generous while tightening the eligibility requirements. However, because 
of the sharp rise in the number of unemployed in recent years, total outlay on 
unemployment benefits has gone up from less than 1 percent of GDP in 1980 
to 1.7 percent in 1995.h 
The projected impact of population aging has been extensively studied since 
the late 1980s, particularly regarding pensions (the Livre Blanc sur les Pen- 
sions summarizing these studies and published in  1992 formed the basis for 
the reform implemented in 1993). Partly due to a decline in the fertility rate in 
the 1960s and 1970s and to the continuous lengthening of life expectancy, the 
old-age dependency ratio (i.e., the ratio of  the number of people aged 65 or 
older to the working-age population) has risen from  12 percent in  1965 to 
about 15 percent in 1995 and is likely to increase over the coming decades to 
peak in 2030 at 23 percent. Official demographic projections (taking into ac- 
count the trend decrease in mortality) show that at the current retirement age 
of 60 years, there will be 2.6 persons of working age for every person of retire- 
ment age in 2000, but only 1.2 persons in 2050. The implication of these demo- 
graphic developments is that spending on pensions and health care is likely to 
rise markedly. Recent official French studies (Briet, Zaidman, and Rubenstein 
1996) show that under unchanged policies, the average rate of  contribution 
needed for financial balance of  the basic pension system would have  to in- 
crease from 18.9 percent in 1990 to 48 percent in 2040. Other studies indicate 
that aging by  itself would tend to increase the share of  health expenditure in 
GDP by  about 3 percentage points by  2050 (e.g., Lenseigne and Ricordeau 
1997). A study of the combined impact of these trends on future generations 
has not, however, been done. The generational accounts computed here are 
thus the first attempt to bring together these prospective developments in an 
unified framework. 
6.  For a number of reasons, unemployment benefits as such represent a relatively small part of 
replacement income. Since the early 1990s, social minima (Revenu Minimum #Insertion-RMI) 
have had an increasing importance, while family allowances have increasingly been reoriented 
from responding to  demographic policies toward being a key element of  the social safety net 
(nevertheless, until 1997, the basic family allowance was targeted at encouraging childbearing, 
not being means tested and being quite generous to families with three or more children). 247  Generational Accounting for France 
11.3  Generational Accounting 
11.3.1  The Basic Framework 
Generational accounting is a new technique developed by  Auerbach, Gok- 
hale, and Kotlikoff (1991) and Kotlikoff (1992) that can be used to study the 
effects on different generations of the government’s fiscal policy. In this frame- 
work, the explicit analysis of the impact of fiscal policy on the welfare of dif- 
ferent generations starts out by computing generational accounts, which sim- 
ply show the present value of the expected net tax payments of a representative 
individual of  a given generation, where “net taxes” refers to taxes paid less 
transfers received and a “generation” is defined as a cohort of individuals of 
the same age and sex. 
Generational accounts are based on the premise that all government pur- 
chases must be paid for; that is, for a given path of government spending, a 
reduction in one generation’s account can only be achieved through expanding 
other generations’ accounts in a way that respects the government’s intertempo- 
ral budget constraint. The budget constraint implies that the government’s cur- 
rent net wealth plus all future taxes paid to the government minus all transfers 
paid by  the government (future net taxes) must cover all future government 
spending on goods and services. In order to compare the intergenerational bur- 
den, the sum of future net taxes is split into an amount paid by  all existing 
generations from the base year onward to the end of  their lives and the re- 
maining amount, which has to be paid by  all future generations during their 
lives. Hence, more formally, the government’s intertemporal budget constraint 
can be written as 
The first term on the left-hand side of  equation (1) adds together the present 
value of the net payments of existing generations. The expression N,(k  = t, 
. .  . ,  t -  D) stands for the present value of net remaining lifetime payments to 
the government of the generation born in year k discounted to year t. The index 
of  this summation runs from age 0 to age D, the maximum length of  life. 
Hence, the first element of this summation (s = 0) is N,,l,  which is the present 
value of net payments of the generation born in year t; the last element (s = 
D)  is Nl,l-D,  the present value of remaining net payments of the oldest genera- 
tion alive in year t, namely, those born in year t -  D.  The second term on the 
left-hand side of equation (1) adds together the present value of remaining net 
payments of future generations. The third term on the left-hand side, W,,  de- 
notes the government’s net wealth in year t. The right-hand side of equation (1) 
expresses the present value of government consumption. In the latter expres- 248  Joaquim Levy and Ousmane Dor6 
sion, G3  stands for government consumption expenditure in year s.  All future 
flows are discounted to year t at the pretax rate of return rj. 
The term NI,k  is defined more explicitly as follows: 
1  k+D 
In expression (2)  Ts,k  stands for the projected average net payment to the gov- 
ernment made in year s  by a member of the generation born in year k. The term 
Ps,k  stands for the number of surviving members of the cohort in year s who 
were born in year k. For generations who are born in year k, where k > t,  the 
summation begins in year k. 
Generational accounts are defined simply as a set of values of NI,k,  one for 
each existing and future generation, with the property that the combined total 
value adds up to the right-hand  side of equation (1). This formulation makes 
clear the implications of the government budget constraint; holding the right- 
hand side of the equation fixed, increased (decreased) government payments 
to (receipts from) existing generations mean a decrease in the first term on the 
left-hand side of equation (1) and require an offsetting increase in the second 
term on the left-hand  side of  equation (1); that is, they require reduced pay- 
ments to, or increased payments from, future generations. 
This framework can be used easily to make two types of comparison. First, 
through the use of lifetime net tax rates, it can be used to compare the lifetime 
net taxes of future generations, of  the generation of people just born, and of 
different generations born in the past; that is, it can be used to determine how 
much future generations are likely to pay in net taxes as compared to genera- 
tions alive today. Second, generational accounting can be used to compare the 
effects of actual or proposed policy changes on the remaining lifetime net tax 
payments of generations currently alive and on future generations. 
11.3.2  The Case of France 
Generational ProJiles and Benchmarking Aggregates 
The construction of generational accounts necessitates first projecting each 
currently  living generation’s average taxes less transfers for each future year 
during which at least some members of the generation will be alive, and then 
converting these projected net tax payments by individuals into an aggregate 
present value. This requires projections of population by age and sex, as well 
as a discount rate to convert flows of net taxes into present values. In the case 
of France, projections of average future taxes and transfers by age and sex start 
with the  1995 aggregate taxes and transfers, as well as medium-term projec- 
tions of transfers and taxes for all levels of  government. These aggregate taxes 
and transfers are distributed across the population by age and sex in each year 
according to the age and  sex pattern  observed in  1990 from official survey 249  Generational Accounting for France 
data. The primary sources for these distributions are the 1990 Enquite sur les 
Revenus Fiscaux des MCnages, the 1991-92  Enqu&te  sur les Actifs Financiers, 
and the 1990 Enqdte sur les Budgets des Familles. A detailed account of the 
construction of  these profiles can be found in the appendix. 
The resulting age and sex profiles of net taxes (i.e., the relative tax weights 
of different living cohorts) are assumed constant through time, except for ad- 
justments reflecting projected changes in the participation rate of women and 
pension indexation (the profile for pensions also varies over time, as explained 
below). The actual value of individuals’ taxes and payments in the medium 
term are found by  scaling individuals’ payments to achieve aggregate values 
consistent with taxes in 1995 and the medium-term fiscal projections, which 
assume inter alia that the economy returns to its “potential” level by year 2002. 
For years beyond 2002, it is assumed that all taxes and transfers not governed 
by other explicit factors increase at the same rate as productivity growth.’  Five 
categories of taxes are distinguished: income tax, property tax, value-added 
tax (VAT), social security contributions, and taxes based on individual wealth 
(including corporate income taxes, the incidence of which was shifted to asset 
holders). Transfer payments are categorized into pensions, health, education, 
and unemployment benefits. For each of  these items, the aggregate amounts 
are allocated according to the existing profiles; all other categories of transfers 
and nondiscriminated government revenues were included in government con- 
sumption. Figures 11.3 and 11.4 present the distribution of taxes and benefits 
in the base year 1995. 
The next step in the construction of France’s generational accounts involves 
an estimation of the initial stock of government net wealth and projections of 
future government consumption. Government consumption is determined by a 
projection over the medium term (see appendix), then by  a rule that assumes 
that spending grows over time from its 2002 level to keep pace with population 
and productivity growth. This amounts to assuming that per capita public con- 
sumption rises at the productivity growth rate. The estimate of  spending in- 
cludes both government spending on goods and services (excluding health and 
educational spending) and public investment, netted by those taxes and receipts 
not included in the five categories described above (it is customary in genera- 
tional accounts to lump public investment together with public current expen- 
diture and not explicitly record the flow of  services from past investment, as 
this convention has no impact on the present value of the net tax burden to the 
extent that individual benefits from public investment cannot be identified). 
For government net wealth, estimates computed by Institut National de la Sta- 
tistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE 1994) are used. In 1995, the con- 
solidated net wealth of the general government was estimated to be FF  800 
billion (about 10 percent of GDP), reflecting the 1993 estimate, adjusted for 
7. E.g., the projected distribution of taxes and transfers by age and sex for, say, 2017 would be 
equal to the 2002 distribution multiplied by (1 + n)”, where n is the rate of productivity growth. 250  Joaquim Levy and Ousmane Dor6 
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Fig. 11.3  Profiles of tax incidence (francs) 
Sources: Data provided by INSEE; authors’ calculations. 
the growth in government debt and the sale of government assets through priva- 
tization in the intervening period. The net financial wealth that is used for the 
baseline calculation was negative, with net liabilities amounting to FF 2,800 
billion, obtained by netting off from the general government debt (estimated at 
FF 4,059 billion in 1995), the financial assets of the general government. 
Using the government intertemporal budget constraint, the average present 
value lifetime net tax payment of each member of each future generation was 
then determined as a residual under the assumption that the average lifetime 251  Generational Accounting for France 
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Fig. 11.4  Profiles of government transfers (francs) 
Sources: Data provided by INSEE; authors’ calculations. 
tax payment of successive generations rises at the economy’s rate of productiv- 
ity growth.8 
The classification  of  taxes and transfers adopted aimed at minimizing the 
arbitrariness in the labeling of taxes and transfers. All flows were fully taken 
into account on a national accounts basis (table 11.4), and the age and gender 
distribution of the net tax burden was allocated in as large a fraction as possible 
8. Detailed Excel spreadsheets used in the calculation of  the accounts are available from the 
authors upon request. Table 11.4  Accounts of the General Government, 1995 (millions of francs) 
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Government consumption Table 11.4  (continued) 
Net Taxes 








Net borrowing requirements 
103,749 
36,019  -36,019  -0.47  Education 
23,412  -23,412  -0.30  Government consumption 
25,213  -25,213  -0.33  Health expenditures 
18,009  -  18,009  -0.23  Unemployment 
257,535  -257,535  -3.35  Government consumption 
103,749  1.35  Government consumption 
-403,778  -5.26 
~~ 
Sources: INSEE (1996) and authors’ calculations. 255  Generational Accounting for France 
to individual cohorts, so as to minimize the problem that the generational ac- 
counts do not recognize the intergenerational distributional implications of the 
government consumption program (see Buiter 1996). 
Key Assumptions and Other Technical Aspects 
A key ingredient in the calculation of generational accounts is the economic 
and demographic assumptions needed in order to extend and discount the com- 
ponents of the zero-sum equation. They are the rate of productivity growth, the 
discount rate, and the rate of population growth. For present purposes, the aver- 
age annual growth of productivity is assumed to be constant at 1.5 percent per 
year over the long run (baseline case). A discount rate of 5 percent is assumed 
in the baseline, but this does not necessarily imply that this rate would be the 
most plausible actual discount rate. Indeed, alternative values of  3 percent 
(which could be viewed as close to real long-run risk-free interest rates) and 7 
percent are also used to gauge the sensitivity of the results to this particular 
parameter. The projection of  population by  age and sex for 1995-2050  pro- 
vided by INSEE corresponds to the “high growth’ case (i.e., a fertility rate of 
2.1 percent and no immigration) found in Dinh (1  994). This trend is extrapo- 
lated through 2200 by assuming that the birthrate stabilizes after 2050. 
Other technical assumptions made in this paper concern the rate of participa- 
tion of the working-age population in the labor force, pension indexation, and 
the growth rate of medical expenditure. As regards the rate of participation, a 
number of studies point to past and projected increases in the participation of 
women in the labor force (see, e.g., Direction de 1’Animation de la RecherchCe, 
des Etudes et des Statistiques [DARES] 1997). This trend is captured here by 
incorporating the observation that the increase in the female participation rate 
has taken place through two mechanisms. First, women who have entered the 
labor force when young have in their majority remained active until retirement. 
Therefore, the future participation rate of  cohorts aged 50 to 60 is likely to 
approach that of  cohorts aged 40 to 50 (adjusted for some early retirement). 
Second, there has been a gradual, albeit small, rise in the participation rate of 
women in their 20s, which is expected to continue (at a decreasing pace) until 
about 2020.9 
The current profile of pension payments reflects several influences, among 
which are the growth of real wages in the past and the indexation of benefits. 
This profile, however, is bound to change overtime. Since 1993, and following 
the proposals in the Livre Blanc sur les Retraites, pension benefits (in the re- 
gime genne‘ral)  have been adjusted in line with the CPI instead of according to 
wages. Accordingly, baseline projections assume that pensions will continue 
9. Using the participation rate as a measure of  economic activity is akin to assuming that the 
unemployment rate is constant in the long run;  in the baseline, this rate is assumed to correspond 
to the current NAIRU (nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment). 256  Joaquirn Levy and Ousmane Dore 
to be indexed to the CPI (although the  1993 pension reform leaves the door 
open for a change in this rule) and that wages will rise in line with productivity 
growth. As to health care, it is assumed that aggregate health expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP will stabilize over the medium term, but beyond the year 
2002, individual health care spending is assumed to rise faster than productiv- 
ity (half a percentage point above the rate of productivity through 2030). This 
is consistent with the experience of the 1980s and early 1990s, when per capita 
real public health expenditures after adjustment for demographic changes rose 
faster than labor productivity, and in contrast with the objectives of the health 
care reform announced in 1995 (see discussion below on the impact that fully 
achieving the objectives of  such reform would have  on the generational ac- 
counts). 
Main Results 
The baseline case compares the generational accounts of males and females 
born in 1995 with the average of those born after 1995. The projections reflect 
policies that were in place or had been announced as of late 1995; therefore, 
they take into account the medium-term fiscal plans contained in the conver- 
gence program presented  at the time. In  the baseline scenario (and except 
where indicated otherwise), the participation rate of women is projected to rise 
while that of men is projected to remain constant, and a zero-indexation rule 
is assumed for pension expenditures, reflecting the fact that accounts are com- 
puted in constant prices. 
The baseline generational accounts for male and female cohorts for the base 
year  1995 are presented in table  11.5 under the assumptions of  1.5 percent 
productivity growth and discount rates of 3, 5, and 7 percent. A negative value 
means that the generation is projected to receive more in transfers than it will 
pay in taxes over its remaining lifetime. Not surprisingly, a life cycle pattern 
emerges, with working-age generations having the higher tax burden and older 
generations being net recipients (working-age generations face many years of 
paying taxes before starting to receive pensions, while some of  the benefits 
they receive indirectly, such as free education for their children, are rather as- 
signed to younger generations). 
For males in the baseline case (with a 5 percent discount rate), the genera- 
tional account (i.e., the remaining net tax payments) is about U.S.$82,000  for 
newborns in 1995, rising to a peak of $320,000 for those who turned age 25 
in 1995 (who have thus completed their education and have to wait yet some 
35 years before retiring). Thereafter, the account falls, becoming negative for 
those aged 50 in 1995, individuals approaching retirement and thus a reduced 
level of income taxes and the receipt of public pension benefits. For females, 
the lifetime pattern is similar, but the accounts at each age are generally much 
lower than for males. For example, newborn females in 1995  face a net lifetime 
fiscal burden of  some $37,000,  which peaks at $220,000 at age 25. The fact 257  Generational Accounting for France 
Table 11.5  Generational  Accounts: Baseline (U.S. dollars) 
r=3  r=5  r=7 
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288 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Nore: Productivity growth assumed to be  1.5 percent; r is the discount rate (percent). 
that accounts for females are lower than for males reflects, first, the lower fe- 
male participation rate and lower pay scale, so that their lifetime gross taxes 
(mainly labor income and social security taxes) are lower, and second, greater 
longevity, which tends to increase the present value of their pensions receipts. 
In the baseline scenario, the average net payment burden of future genera- 
tions is about two times higher than that faced by the youngest generation alive 
in 1995 (represented by the 0-4-year-old  cohort of  1995).1° If  all generations 
born before 1995 are protected from any change in their lifetime net tax pro- 
files, future generations will have to pay  on average about 96 percent more 
than the youngest “protected” generation, in order to guarantee the ultimate 
solvency of  the government. Assuming that the tax burden of future genera- 
10. A baseline scenario incorporating recent health care reforms would yield smaller genera- 
tional imbalance. See, e.g., Levy and Dort (1998). 258  Joaquim Levy and Ousmane Dor6 
tions will be shared by men and women proportionally to the net tax burden 
faced by men and women belonging to the 1995 newborn generation, the life- 
time net tax paid by males in future generations would amount to $161,000, 
while women would pay $73,000 over their lifetimes. 
11.4  Sensitivity Analysis 
11.4.1  Sensitivity with Respect to the Parameter Values 
Generational  imbalances  are  sensitive to assumptions regarding  discount 
and productivity  growth rates. Table 11.6 shows the impact of  varying these 
parameters in the range of 3 and 7 percent and 1 and 2 percent, respectively. 
For a given productivity  growth, a higher discount rate tends to increase the 
generational imbalance as measured by the percentage difference in the pres- 
ent value of taxes paid by future generations and the newly born, since it gives 
a lower weight to future payments.”  On the other hand, the effect of rising 
productivity is ambiguous, lowering the relative burden of future generations 
for sufficiently high discount rates, and increasing it for low discount rates. 
(Indeed, when the generational imbalance is expressed as a ratio of the present 
value of lifetime incomes, the effect of change in productivity can be reversed.) 
The intuition for this result is that higher productivity increases the present 
values of both taxes and transfers. However, because of the life cycle pattern 
of consumption and the discounting factor, when  the discount rate is suffi- 
ciently high the increase in the present value of taxes (which are paid earlier 
in life) outweighs the increase in the present value of benefits. For low enough 
discount rates, the increase in benefits (which come later in life), together with 
higher government consumption (which also grows at the productivity rate for- 
ever), implies a higher burden on future generations (even after adjusting for 
“effective” labor). For parameters in the range chosen, the imbalance always 
decreases when productivity  growth increases (mainly because pensions are 
indexed to the CPI and not to wages). 
11.4.2  Sensitivity with Respect to Accounting Conventions 
Although the technique of generational accounting aims for an analysis of 
public finances free of labels that can be misleading, some conceptual prob- 
lems arise when accounts are being calculated. Because generational accounts 
deal with net flows, differences in the way some taxes or benefits are classified 
11. In general, the change in the imbalance is not a positive monotonic function of the change 
in discount rate. Although the net present value of  all net taxes decreases monotonically with 
higher interest rates, the change in the imbalance need not, owing to the uneven distribution of 
taxes over the lifetimes of  current generations (e.g., the impact of a higher discount rate is more 
marked for women than for men). Moreover, the ratio of net cash flows of  newborns and future 
generations may either rise or fall. Table 11.6  Sensitivity Analysis with Respect to Productivity and Discount Rates (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
g=1  g = 1.5  g=2 
r=3  r=5  r=7  r=3  r=5  r=7  r=3  r=5  r=7 
Newborns 
Male  125.2  66.5  15.8  140.3  82.2  25.6  153.1  99.1  36.4 
Female  91.4  25.1  -10.1  110.6  31.2  -3.7  130.8  50.9  3.5 
Male  264.9  147.5  187.2  285.1  161.4  99.3  304.4  178.5  94.1 
Female  193.2  55.5  -  117.9  224.8  73.1  -  14.4  260.3  91.8  9.  I 
Future generations 
Generational balance (% difference)  111  122  1,077  103  96  288  99  80  158 
Source; Authors’ calculations. 
Note: g is productivity growth (percent); r is discount rate (percent). 260  Joaquim Levy and Ousmane Dork 
Table 11.7  Sensitivity with Respect to Accounting Conventions: Education Recorded as 
Government Consumption (US.  dollars) 
~~  ~~ 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Nore: Productivity growth assumed to be 1.5 percent; r  is the discount rate (percent) 
can have an impact. These problems are illustrated by adopting alternative as- 
sumptions about the classification of educational expenditure.I2 
In the baseline case presented above, educational expenditures were classi- 
fied as transfer payments, and thus allocated to specific cohorts of the popula- 
tion. The scenario presented below indicates that if education is treated as gov- 
ernment consumption,  the  generational imbalance  would  be reduced  by  50 
percent  (table 11.7). While the average lifetime net tax payments of both the 
12. The sensitivity of generational accounts with respect to the incidence of  particular taxes 
(capital income tax), and the treatment of selected sources of government income associated with 
its net wealth, is treated elsewhere. If corporate income taxes are netted off government consump- 
tion instead of being lumped with other capital income taxes whose incidence was assumed to be 
proportional to the net wealth of individuals, the relative additional burden on future generations 
vis-8-vis the newly born increases. Considering total net wealth of the government instead of its 
financial net wealth and offsetting it against operational income received by the government would 
also increase the relative intergenerational imbalance. See Levy and Dort (1998). 261  Generational Accounting for France 
newborns and future generations increase, the percentage difference between 
them  actually declines. The intuition  for a  smaller  generational  imbalance 
under this category of classification is as follows: Treating education as gov- 
ernment consumption amounts to reducing transfer payments that were to be 
received  when  young  and  having  higher  government  spending  to finance. 
Because future generations would face both the cut in educational transfers and 
the incipient tax increase in later years, their accounts will fall in relative terms. 
11.5  Generational Accounts of Baby Boomers 
The standard practice of  generational accounting includes only future net 
tax payments and does not incorporate past net payments of currently living 
generations. Therefore, the only meaningful comparison of generational ac- 
counts is between those of newly born generations in the base year and those 
of  future generations, for whom lifetime net tax payments are available. Al- 
though this way  of presenting generational accounts yields insightful results 
regarding intergenerational imbalances, its interpretation may have less policy 
relevance than measures aimed at comparing the accounts of those presently 
living. Indeed, by comparing only the tax burden of unborn generations with 
that of current children, standard generational accounts avoid addressing the 
real political  dilemma, which involves a trade-off  among living generations. 
To address this kind of question, it is rather more interesting to compare the 
net tax burden of, say, current adults (e.g., some cohorts of baby boomers) with 
that of young generations (e.g., those under age 25, who have not fully entered 
the labor force yet) under the assumption that young generations will bear the 
same tax burden as all future generations. Such estimates involve the retrospec- 
tive calculations of generational accounts as a first step (such calculations are 
presented for instance by Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff  1994 for the case 
of the United States). But they also involve the netting out of the present value 
of past net taxes of  those living generations lumped with future generations 
from the government wealth, and the adjustment of accounts of different gener- 
ations to past (and varying), as well as projected (and constant), productivity 
growth. 
The advantage of this approach of contrasting living adult and young genera- 
tions, relative to the standard accounts, which assume that all generations alive 
in  1995 will be “protected” for their entire lifetimes, is that this assumption is 
somewhat implausible. Owing to demographic changes evident already in the 
early decades of the next century, the heavier burden on future generations will 
start to be apparent at a relatively early date, implying heavy pressure for pol- 
icy changes that most likely will affect currently living  generation^.'^ As a 
13. Of course, policy changes that formally affect only future generations’ accounts can have 
an  impact on the welfare of  current generations. For  instance, a cut in public expenditure on 
education for future generations, while not directly affecting the tax profile of current generations 262  Joaquim Levy and Ousmane Dor6 
Table 11.8  Generational Accounts for Baby Boomers: Lifetime Net Tax Payments 
Converted into 1995 Present Values (thousands of U.S.  dollars) 
g = 1.5  Historical Productivity Growth 




























































-  15,094 
-  16,992 







Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: g is productivity growth (percent); r is discount rate (percent). 
”The 1950-55  cohort. 
bCurrent youngsters (under 25 years of age) and all future generations. 
yardstick, the generation born in 1950-55 was chosen to represent adult living 
generations in the computation of  the imbalance between “protected’ adult 
generations and “ultimately unprotected” young and future generations.  l4  For 
this purpose, not only future net transfers were projected (as is done in the 
standard exercise), but retrospective accounts of past net transfers of adult gen- 
erations were computed, considering in one case only constant productivity 
growth of  1.5 percent, and in another case taking into account the historical 
productivity growth rates observed in  1950-95  (details of the computation of 
the past net tax burden can be found in the appendix). 
The calculations reported in table 11.8 indicate that under the present system 
of taxes and benefits (and a discount rate of  5 percent), the projected net tax 
burden on generations currently under age 25 is on average about two times as 
(when public expenditure on education is recorded among transfers), would likely reduce their 
actual net income to the extent that parents would have to shoulder the cost of educating their 
children. It should also be kept in mind that differences in the treatment of taxpayers based on 
specific characteristics that might be implied by the coexistence of “protected” and “unprotected’ 
generations already exist, although they are marginal (eg,  senior citizens often pay lower health 
contributions than working-age persons, couples and large families tend to benefit from income 
tax deductions). 
14. The generation born in the early 1950s is representative in many ways. It fully experienced 
what came to be known as the “30 glorious” years of  economic growth (which lasted until the 
1980s)  and is associated with the May 1968 students’ movement, as well as subsequent transforma- 
tions in the university and society in general. 263  Generational Accounting for France 
Table 11.9  Sources of Generational Imbalance (thousands  of U.S. dollars) 
~___ 
Constant 
Baseline Case  Demographic  Zero Debt 
A  B  A  B  A  B 
Newborns 
Male  151.5  82.2  176.5  107.5  151.5  82.2 
Female  102.1  37.2  109.5  45.1  102.1  37.2 
Male  222.8  161.4  184.1  113.7  182.1  114.5 
Female  150.1  73.1  114.2  47.6  120.5  51.8 
(% difference)  47  96  4  6  20  39 
Future generations 
Generational imbalance 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: A: educational expenditure treated as government consumption. B: Educational expenditure treated 
as government transfers. 
large as that faced by  those born around 1950, when the “historical” rate of 
productivity growth is used for comparing the burden on current adult genera- 
tions. If generations are put on an equal footing without considering past fluc- 
tuations of the productivity growth rate (i.e., by  simply using the 1.5 percent 
growth rate adjustment), the imbalance is on the order of 35 percent. The im- 
balance is very sensitive to the discount rate chosen, particularly when the ad- 
justment to productivity is made using the simple constant rate.I5 
11.6  Sources of Generational Imbalance 
The generational imbalance reported above reflects three major factors: fu- 
ture demographic changes, the level of public debt, and the underlying fiscal 
position of the general government (including the extensive social security sys- 
tem). In the absence of demographic changes (i.e., assuming a constant popula- 
tion structure), France’s generational imbalance would be much smaller (6  per- 
cent). Likewise, the imbalance falls to 40 percent when the debt level is zero 
(table 11.9). To the extent that generational accounts reflect the current stance 
of  fiscal policy, redressing the generational imbalance can also be achieved 
by  chmges in policies that result in strong improvement in fiscal positions. 
Increasing government revenues from general or specific taxes, cutting govern- 
ment consumption across the board, or addressing the problems in the pension 
and public health care systems are policies that could help correct the genera- 
tional imbalance. 
15. The use of a high real discount rate yields results that are somewhat curious but not irnplau- 
sible given that real interest rates in the 1970s and early 1980s were actually negative. 264  Joaquim Levy and Ousmane Do& 
Table 11.10  Alternative Ways to Achieve Generational Balance (percentage 
change from baseline) 
Cut in  Cut in 
Government  Government  Increase in  Increase in 
Variant  Purchases  Transfers  All Taxes  Income Tax 
A  17.2  11.5  7.1  66 
B  22.2  9.8  6.9  64 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: A: Educational expenditure treated as government consumption. B: Educational expenditure 
treated as government transfers. 
11.7  Restoring Generational Balance 
What changes in taxes and transfers would be required to restore the genera- 
tional accounts of the newborn and future French to fiscal balance? Table l l.  10 
suggests the magnitude of the policy adjustments necessary to achieve genera- 
tional balance in France’s fiscal policy. The measures considered there are an 
across-the-board increase in the overall level of taxes, an increase in the in- 
come tax, a cut in transfers, and a cut in government consumption. These mea- 
sures are assumed to be permanent and to take effect as of  2002. The sizes of 
the policy adjustments required to restore generational balance are calculated 
under two variants: educational expenditure treated as government consump- 
tion (variant A) and as government transfers (variant B). 
The overall level of taxes would have to be raised by 7.1 percent (variant A) 
and 6.9 percent (variant B) for generational balance to be restored under the 
baseline assumption of 1.5 percent productivity growth and 5 percent discount 
rate. If the adjustment is made solely by  raising traditional personal  income 
taxes, these will increase by 66 percent (variant A) and 64 percent (variant B), 
as these taxes represent a small share of government revenues (less than half 
of French households pay traditional direct income taxes; as mentioned in sec- 
tion  11.2, flat income taxes introduced in the 1990s are much broader based). 
It appears that a policy of increasing the level of taxation would involve sub- 
stantial increases in the burden  on young and middle-aged  generations;  for 
example, newborn and 30-year-old males would be required to pay an addi- 
tional $40,000 and $30,000 in net terms, respectively. The net payment burden 
on future generations, on the other hand, falls by about 40 percent. Restoring 
balance through expenditure reductions would require permanently  reducing 
the size of government purchases  by  17.2 percent under variant A and 22.2 
percent under variant B. Alternatively, permanent across-the-board reductions 
in transfers of 11.5 percent (variant A) and 9.8 percent (variant B) would yield 
a generationally balanced policy. 
In view of the already high level of taxation in France, expenditure cuts as 
a way to achieve intergenerational  balance would appear to be preferable to 
further increases in the tax burden. Moreover, while there may be scope for 265  Generational Accounting for France 
reductions in government consumption, it is in the area of social transfers that 
France (together with other European countries) should focus the adjustment. 
In particular, as noted above, the pending demographic transition, with the pro- 
jected  increase in the dependency  ratio,  is at the root  of  a large portion  of 
the intergenerational imbalance implicit in current policies. Therefore, policies 
need to address the challenges in these areas. In fairness, the recognition  by 
the French of the need for an early adjustment motivated both the health care 
reforms announced in November  1995 (reflecting  discussions among social 
partners and several studies carried out in past years) and the pension reforms 
designed in the early 1990s and partially implemented in 1993 (mainly affect- 
ing the basic pension scheme, rkgime gknkrul) and 1996 (with respect to sup- 
plementary  mandatory  pension  schemes)-most  notably  the  indexation  of 
pensions to the CPI instead of to wages. 
The baseline scenario discussed in section 1  1.3 incorporates conservative 
assumptions about the growth in health care spending. In particular, it builds 
on trends in the past 20 years, and on the argument that total health care expen- 
diture will increase faster than labor productivity  because health care can be 
viewed as a superior good. This argument carries some weight, and in the case 
of France  where public health  care has now been  officially recognized as a 
universal right, it is broadly appropriate. On the other hand, the reforms en- 
acted in  1995 aimed  at establishing incentives  and mechanisms that would 
slow down the growth of  these expenditures, while guaranteeing the quality 
of services.16 
While some aspects of  the reform of the health care system have already 
brought results, it is still too early to judge how fast some of its key provisions 
will be implemented. The importance of fully implementing the reform can, 
however, hardly be overestimated. Table 11.11 shows the intergenerational im- 
pact of assuming that the reform will take full effect before the year 2000, inter 
alia limiting the growth in per capita health spending (for a given age) to labor 
productivity  growth  after 2000. This  alternative  future path  for outlays  on 
health care would cut the intergenerational imbalance roughly by half, giving 
a net tax burden on future generations that is one and a half times as large as 
that facing newborns. 
The early pension reform also alleviated the future intergenerational imbal- 
ance. The calculations presented in table 11.12 show that, were pensions still 
indexed to wages, for example, increasing at real rates of 1 to 1.5 percent a 
year, the intergenerational imbalance would be more than twice as large, rising 
to more than  140 percent. However, it is clear that if projected  increases in 
16.  Expenditure restraints on hospital care, while relatively successful, proved to be increasingly 
distortionary. A major aspect of the 1995 reform was an attempt to regionalize hospital budgets 
and consolidate the system, with a view also to correcting the geographic imbalance in the distribu- 
tion of beds and services entailed by demographic changes that had occurred since the 1970s. For 
a full discussion of the  1995 health care reform,  see International Monetary Fund (IMF 1997, 
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Table 11.11  Generational Accounts with Slower Health Care Growth (U.S. dollars) 
r=3  r=5  r=  7 
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259,404 
58 
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-  172,928 
-  133,045 





























Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note:  Per capita health care grows at the rate of productivity (1.5 percent) beyond the medium term. r is 
the discount rate (percent). 
life expectancy are not accompanied by longer working lives and contribution 
periods for a full pension, it will be difficult to eliminate the intergenerational 
problem that is manifest in the baseline projections. 
Increasing the participation rate (by tightening eligibility requirements for 
benefits and increasing the taxation of replacement income, including from 
early retirement) would thus appear to be a policy that could substantially con- 
tribute to improving the generational stance of fiscal policy: a higher participa- 
tion rate not only widens the tax base by  raising labor income and GDP but 
also reduces pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP. A characteristic of 
the French labor market since the mid-1980s is the relatively low level of labor 
participation, particularly for people aged 55-65,  while life expectancy contin- 
ues to increase. As  the participation rate of this group of people declined from 
31.5 to 16.5 percent despite a significant increase in the participation rate of 
women, its proportion in the active population fell from 18.7 in the 1960s to 
9.4 percent in  1995 (DARES  1997). Between  1968 and  1995, participation 267  Generational Accounting for France 
Table 11.12  Generational Accounts with Pensions Indexed to Wages (US.  dollars) 
r=  3  r=5  r=7 
Generation’s 







































-  168,734 
-  177,047 
-  101,447 
-  109,300 
-99,988 













-  16,380 
-  100,465 
-  136,466 
-  134,762 
-111,542 


















-  158,023 
-  197,014 
-  199,879 
-  151,497 
-  162,135 
-93,948 





34,150  24,494 
61,416  62,470 
95,764  111,244 
129,660  i61,680 
181,148  232,396 
217,020  280,375 
209,403  273,614 
185,122  240,820 
143,688  181,442 
89,752  103,347 
3 1,597  17,029 
-53,811  -106,825 
-100,390  -164,612 
~  106,926  -  175,435 
-91,855  -134,820 
-  103,600  -  148,190 
-67,958  -86,935 
-73,212  -96,974 
-72,308  -89,642 
-73,395  -96,111 
82,704  134,982 























Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Nore: Productivity growth assumed to be 1.5 percent; r is the discount rate (percent). 
rates for males aged 60-65  dropped from 68 percent to about 15 percent with 
virtually no change for those aged 55-59.  For females aged 60-65,  there was 
a decline from 35 percent to about 13 percent, whereas those in the 55-59  age 
group experienced an increase in participation rates from 42 to 55 percent 
during the same period. Table  11.13 shows that by inducing rises in the male 
participation rates of those aged 55-59  and 60-65  in 2010 to 75 and 50 per- 
cent, respectively (and 73 and 40 percent for women), and keeping the replace- 
ment rate of initial pensions unchanged, the imbalance between newborn and 
future generations is eliminated. Moreover, if the increase starts to take place 
by  the year 2000, so that by  2005 most of  the adjustment is completed, the 
imbalance between baby boom generations and future generations (including 
current young generations) would be eliminated for the central assumption of 
a discount rate of 5 percent (table 11.14). 
An  increase to 50 percent in the participation rate of those aged 60-65  is 
consistent with both a three-year increase in the retirement age and a five-year 268  Joaquim Levy and Ousmane Do& 
Table 11.13  Generational  Accounts with Changes in Participation Rates (US.  dollars) 
r=3  r=5  r=7 
Generation’s 
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-  180,793 
-230,286 
-224,474 
-  168,290 
-  176,883 
-101,399 
-  109,300 
-99,988 
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133,6  15 
-4,363 
-  132,053 
-195,433 
-  199,026 
-  15  1,133 
-161,999 
-93,908 


















-  105,959 
-91,395 
-  103,400 
-67,894 
















-  89,124 
-  163,432 
-  174,786 
-  134,540 
-  148,085 
-86,904 
-96,974 
-  89,642 
-96,111 
-  1,752 
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Source; Authors’ calculations. 
Note:  From 2005 onward, the participation rates for males and females increase to 75 and 73 percent for 
the 55-59  cohorts, 50 and 40 percent for the 60-64  cohorts, and 8 percent for people aged 65 and older. 
Productivity growth assumed to be 1.5 percent; r is the discount rate (percent). 
increase in the retirement age with fewer working hours in later years-thus 
leaving ample room for a variety of policy alternatives.”  However, a key mea- 
sure to achieve this objective would be to consider increasing the number of 
years required for retiring with a full pension to 45 (adjusting at the same time 
the formula for computing benefits and the minimum contributive pension). 
While the 1993 reform included a gradual increase in the number of years from 
37 to 40, it fell short of  the increase to 42 proposed in the Livre Blanc. Its 
potential effect is thus projected to be quite limited because more than half of 
workers already retire with 40 years of contributions, while the effective pen- 
17. While increasing the proportion of people younger than age 65 who work could lead to a 
surge in output and taxes (even under the assumption of a constant share of labor in GDP) and 
reduced pressures on pensions, achieving this goal would require that both labor supply and de- 
mand be stimulated. In this regard, calibration of wages and working hours to ensure that the labor 
market clears for older workers is also likely to be required at an early stage. 269  Generational Accounting for France 
Table 11.14  Generational  Accounts for Baby Boomers with Changes in Participation 
Rates (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
g = 1.5  Historical Productivity Growth 
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-  15 
-13 
-  14 
-  11,861 
-  14,888 







~~  ~~ 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Note: From 2015 onward, the participation rates for males and females aged 60-65  increase to 50 and 40 
percent, respectively. g is productivity growth (percent): r is discount rate (percent). 
'The  1950-55 cohort. 
bCurrent youngsters (under 25 years of age) and all future generations. 
sion for those with fewer than 32.5 years of contributions is determined by the 
relatively high level of the minimum pension (Briet et al. 1996). The increase 
in the number of  years of contributions (if accompanied by  an adjustment of 
the minimum contributive pension) would not require the abolition of the right 
to retire at age 60, while it would create incentives for longer careers and en- 
hance economic activity.I8  From a fiscal point of view, the increase in the num- 
ber of  years should be accompanied by a change in the formula for computing 
benefits (i.e., the number of years of contributions used in the denominator of 
the formula should increase accordingly). 
11.8  Conclusions 
This paper has presented the first set of  generational accounts for France 
with a view to assessing the implications for future generations, given current 
18. In principle, working at increasingly older ages should become less of a burden, as intellec- 
tual work tends to be replacing repetitive manual work. It would also be compatible with more 
flexible working lives (admitting career switches and breaks) that have become increasingly com- 
mon among skilled workers. In this context, increasing the number of years of contribution, instead 
of the minimum retirement age, protects those who have entered the labor force at early ages, 
while being fair to those who entered later. In particular, given that education in France is free, it 
is equitable to require from those who received more benefits to stay much longer in the labor 
force. In this connection, if greater wage differentiation is allowed, increasing the number of years 
of contribution would not need to create disincentives to accumulating human capital. 270  Joaquim Levy and Ousmane Dork 
fiscal rules, of  the growth in government spending and debt, taking into ac- 
count the effects of demographic projections and other factors such as the an- 
ticipated change in labor force participation rates. The calculations reported in 
this study indicate that the present system of benefits and taxes, if continuously 
maintained for current adults, is out of balance in the long run from a genera- 
tional perspective. The size of the standard generational imbalance implies that 
a lack of fiscal policy adjustment will leave future generations of French citi- 
zens facing a lifetime net tax burden that is more than one and a half times as 
large as those confronting current adult generations based on existing policies. 
Fortunately, policies can be specified that could help alleviate such an imbal- 
ance, in particular those aimed at fostering higher employment and later retire- 
ment among cohorts aged 55-65.  It is shown that an early but gradual increase 
to 40  percent  in the labor force participation rate of people  aged 60-65- 
combined with  longer pension contribution periods-would  sharply  reduce 
the generational imbalance between young and future generations, as well as 
the imbalance between current adult and young generations, with a decrease 
in the absolute net tax burden on future generations. Moreover, a specific set 
of policies is presented that could help restore balance; for example, a 10 per- 
cent cut in transfer payments, a 17 percent reduction in government spending, 
a 7 percent increase in taxes, or some combination of  these policies could, 
under plausible economic and demographic assumptions, bring France’s gener- 
ational policy into balance. 
Appendix 
Source and Data Construction 
As explained above, average net tax payments for each generation were calcu- 
lated by distributing aggregate taxes and transfers across the population of co- 
horts according to the agehex profiles of payments and benefits observed. This 
required first an estimation of a generational profile (i.e., by individual cohorts 
of age and gender) of different taxes and benefits in some base year. This was 
done principally using 1990 data from surveys conducted by the tax adminis- 
tration department of the Ministry of Finance and INSEE. In a second step, the 
aggregate weight of each tax or benefit was computed using information in the 
annual national accounts published by INSEE. 
Computation of Profiles 
Figure 11.3  presents the agehex profiles for the five categories of tax consid- 
ered (personal income tax, property tax, wealth tax, social security tax, and 
consumption tax). The profiles corresponding to personal income taxes, prop- 
erty taxes, and consumption taxes were based primarily on data from a 1990 271  Generational Accounting for France 
tax  survey conducted by  the Ministry of  Finance (Enquite sur les Revenus 
Fiscaux des MCnages). INSEE provided a breakdown of the results of the 1990 
survey on these taxes according to the age of the head of household surveyed, 
but a disaggregation by  gender was necessary for the study at hand and was 
thus inferred from additional sources. This disaggregation is not trivial because 
the differences in income between men and women vary over the life cycle 
according to marital status, childbearing, and so forth. Therefore, in order to 
take these factors into account, a more detailed disaggregation of the 1984 and 
1990 tax  surveys (Canceill  1989; Campagne, Contenci, and Roineau  1996) 
and data on the number of individuals at each age living in different types of 
households (from the 1990 population census) were also used. Canceill(1989) 
provides several tables showing the average income and personal income tax 
payments of different types of households (persons living alone; couples with- 
out children; couples with one, two, or three children; households headed by 
single parents; etc.). Crossing this information with census data on the popula- 
tion living in different types of households (individus  selon le sexe, 1 hge, et le 
mode de vie; INSEE 1990), guided us in disaggregating by gender the figures 
by household in the original survey.19  The disaggregation of  VAT,  and other 
indirect taxes, was computed by  assuming similar consumption profiles for 
men and women (i.e., assuming that for each age cohort, individuals of both 
genders pay the same amount of consumption-based taxes). 
The profiles corresponding to social security contributions were based pri- 
marily on the distribution of wages and employment. They were estimated us- 
ing the age profiles of wages computed by INSEE (Colin 1995; Perotin 1989) 
and the average proportion between the wages received by  men and women 
found in Bayet (  1996).20  The average individual contribution to the social secu- 
rity system was then computed by adjusting the average contribution paid by 
employed persons to the employment rate of different age and gender cohorts 
estimated using data in DARES (1997). 
The profile corresponding to corporate income taxes and wealth taxes was 
based on the distribution of financial assets across ages (Enquste sur le Patri- 
moine des Familles). This, along  with the profile of  other taxes related  to 
wealth and income (autres imp&  sur le revenue et le patrimoine),  was com- 
puted using the age distribution of  net wealth found in Lollivier and Verger 
(1996), adjusted for the distribution among genders based on figures in Stur- 
rock (1995) and Franco et al. (1992). Following the generational accounting 
19. This approximation is evidently based on a number of assumptions (e.g.. in  households 
comprising a couple headed by  a man, both adults would have the same age), as well  as some 
judgment about the tax incidence on certain populations (e.g.,  retired couples, which make up the 
majority of childless couples on which information could be found in Canceill). The overall impact 
of imprecisions arising from these assumptions appear to be minor. 
20. Age profiles for men and women in  different professions shown in  Colin (1995) do not 
provide full coverage of the working population and thus had to be marginally adjusted according 
to  the full-coverage profiles provided in Perotin (1989); for the same reason, the overall average 
men-to-women wage ratio was taken from Bayet (1996). 272  Joaquim Levy and Ousmane Dork 
study by the US.  Congressional Budget Office (Sturrock 1995), the incidence 
of corporate income tax was assumed to be related to the net wealth of  indi- 
viduals. 
The profiles of  individualized transfers comprising pensions, health bene- 
fits, public expenditure on education, and unemployment benefits (in addition 
to minimum income benefits, typically the RMI) are shown in figure 11.4.  The 
profiles for expenditure on education were based on the average cost per stu- 
dent (in  1988) for different school ages (Ministkre de 1'Education Nationale 
1990), attendance rates, and the assumption that these costs were the same for 
students of  both  genders. The profiles for expenditure  on health care  were 
computed using the chart found in Caussat and Glaude (1993) and data in 
Mizhari and Mizhari (1995). The profiles of expenditure on pensions and un- 
employment benejits were based on figures provided by INSEE.21  The age and 
gender distribution of pension expenditures found there was smoothed, permit- 
ting the elimination of some outliers, especially for old and young ages. Ex- 
penditures  on minimum support  income  and  other  specific  social  transfers 
were distributed according to the profile of unemployment benefits.22 
Computation of the Relative Tax Weights 
The assignment of  the actual weights of individual taxes and benefits was 
based on national accounts figures  (INSEE  1996) and followed  closely the 
taxonomy perfected by French statisticians, which guarantees the internal con- 
sistency of fiscal magnitudes. General government resources and emplois (in- 
come and expenditures; see table 11.4) were taken from the national accounts 
yearbook Comptes et Zndicateurs Econorniques (table 10.17, administrations 
publiques,  S60). They were classified as much as possible according to the 
group of taxes and transfers listed above, with those items that could not be 
assigned to any group being lumped into general government net consumption 
(see Hagemann and John 1995 for a rationale behind this choice of aggrega- 
tion). Government expenditures on services for which beneficiaries  could be 
identified but which are usually  included in government consumption in the 
sense of the national accounts (e.g., payment of  hospital personnel and teach- 
ers) were lumped with transfers. This breakdown of government consumption 
(found in the P30 line in the national accounts) and investment was computed 
based on figures in tables 10.07 and 10.08 of the national accounts yearbook 
(ventilation fonctionelle de la consommation et de la formation brute de capi- 
21. The profile of unemployment benefits reflects the increase in unemployment in the years 
before the minimum retirement age (60 years) and before the standard retirement age (65 years). 
While the first peak is easy to understand, the causes of the concentration of unemployment bene- 
fits close to 65 years of age are not obvious. 
22. Ideally, these should be allocated according to the distribution of the RMI. However, given 
the relatively small magnitude of these categories of transfers (about 0.3 percent of GDP in 1995). 
changing the profile from unemployment benefits to RMI is unlikely to change the results obtained 
thus far. 273  Generational Accounting for France 
tal fie des administration publiques). Finally, payments of pensions to gov- 
ernment  employees were  lumped with  pensions  to  private  sector workers, 
although the contributions that fund them were left at the charge of the gov- 
ernment and not shifted to government employees (in the case of the private sec- 
tor, both employers’ and employees’ contributions are shifted to  employee^).^^ 
The taxes and transfers identified in  table  11.4 were grouped together in 
table 11A.  1 to show the weight of individual taxes and transfers and of govern- 
ment consumption as percentages of  GDP for the period 1995-2002.  The ag- 
gregate taxes and transfers for 1996-2002  reflect inter alia the changes in taxa- 
tion that have occurred since 1995 and the government goals for 1997-2002. 
In particular, it assumes a fiscal rule consistent with the government’s conver- 
gence targets of a general government deficit below 3  percent after 1997.  This 
fiscal consolidation was assumed to be achieved chiefly through a compression 
in net government consumption, together with a curbing of health expenditure 
and unemployment benefits, and a constant tax pressure, except for the gradual 
reduction in personal income tax included in the 1997 budget (which envis- 
aged a reduction  in income taxes totaling 0.8 percent  of  GDP by  the year 
2001). 
The actual average tax payment and transfer receipts of individuals in each 
age cohort can then easily be computed by scaling the age and gender profiles 
of individual taxes and transfers such that the respective figures aggregated by 
cohorts are made consistent with the aggregate weight of  the corresponding 
tax or transfer for a given year. 
Computation of Generational Profiles for the 1950-55  Cohorts 
To compute the past net tax burden of the 1950-55 cohort, national accounts 
flows covering the income and expenditures of the public administration in the 
1970-95 period were distributed over individual net payment profiles based on 
the profiles derived for 1995.  The main adjustments to these profiles comprised 
changes in the age distribution of health expenditure, VAT,  and social security 
taxes (based on Mizhari and Mizhari 1995,  and INSEE sources).24  To compare 
the net payments of the 1950 and 1995 generations, the present value of net 
taxes paid by  the  1950 generation was computed as of  1950 (i.e., flows in 
1995 francs were discounted back to 1950)  and then adjusted for productivity 
growth. The relative burden on each generation was computed by scaling dis- 
23. This problem can be dealt with by including government pensions in government consump- 
tion, or by distributing the cunrributionsfictives made by the government to itself on behalf of its 
employees according to the age profile of  public workers. 
24. Changes in the distribution of income taxes were not pursued, because for 1970 only the 
distribution of taxable income was available. While the distribution of  taxable income does not 
permit an easy estimate of  the distribution of  taxes, owing mainly to changes in  the effective 
marginal tax rates, it shows a clear concentration of those paying income taxes; as fewer and fewer 
households were subjected to the income tax over the years, those liable to any tax started to be 
concentrated in the cohorts of 40 to 55 years of age. Table llA.l  France: Medium-Term Fiscal Projection (percent of GDP) 
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Personal income tax 
Property taxes 
Taxes related to consumption 
Taxes related to individual net wealth 
Social security contributions 
Total taxes 
Expenditure on pensions 
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Source: Staff projections based on the authorities’ convergence plan. 275  Generational Accounting for France 
counted net taxes according to a 1.5 percent productivity  growth rate and (in 
the “historical”  case) taking into account the fluctuation of past productivity 
growth. 
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